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The e¤ects that regulation has on the innovation and the introduction of new telecommu-
nications services have not been previously quanti…ed in the literature. This study compares
state-regulated services in Indiana under rate of return regulation (RoRR) and under alternative
regulation. The econometric model comprises an count process (for innovation) followed by a
duration process with selection (for regulatory delay). Moving away from RoRR increased the
rate of service creation to three times the old rate. Expected approval delays nearly disappear.
A prediction exercise indicates that the …rm would have introduced 12 times as many services
to consumers if the alternative regulation had been in place the entire time.
Keywords: regulation, product innovation, telecommunications, count data, duration data,
tobit model
¤This work is based on chapter 7 of my dissertation (Prieger, 1999). I acknowledge the support of many people
at Ameritech, LECG, Inc., and the University of California, Berkeley, without which this study would not have been
possible. At Ameritech, I thank in particular Ken Dunmore, Bruce Hazelett, and Larry Strickling (now at the FCC).
At UC Berkeley, I thank my dissertation advisor Rich Gilbert and others. Early parts of the project received …nancial
support from Ameritech through LECG; all opinions and errors are my own. PRELIMINARY—DO NOT CITE
WITHOUT PERMISSION.
11 Introduction
Telecommunications regulation in the United States has changed rapidly in the past 15 years.
Regulatory authorities in many states have moved away from rate of return regulation (RoRR)
toward incentive regulation such as price caps. Most often, regulatory reform has focused on
improving consumers’ access to existing services: lower prices, availability to more households,
higher service quality, improved e¢ciency in production, and so on. The economic literature
also mirrors this emphasis. Most regulation studies take the existing product mix as given and
look at “getting the prices right” or the incentive to reduce costs. Often overlooked—in both the
regulatory arena and theeconomicliterature—aretheimpacts on incentivesto createandintroduce
new products. This study quanti…es the impact of a regulatory reform in Indiana on the creation
and introduction of new services.
The regulatory regime change ofinterest is a form of alternative regulation known as Opportu-
nity Indiana, described more fully in the next section. In 1994, the Indiana regulatory commission
switched from traditional RoRR of Ameritech Indiana1 to a combination of price caps and market
(i.e., unregulated) pricing.2 Since RoRR limits the ability of the …rm to retain as pro…t the eco-
nomic bene…t created by the service,3 market pricing should increase the incentive to introduce a
new product. Similarly, by controlling prices rather than pro…t levels, it is possible that a price
caps regime would also see more new products than a rate of return regime.4 This study …nds
that the incentives did increase under Opportunity Indiana: the creation of new services went up
by 97% to 359%, depending on the type of service.
Theliteratureon price caps and innovation focusesalmost exclusively on cost reduction, known
1Ameritech is the Bell Operating Company in Indiana, with 62% of the local phone lines. Ameritech’s operating
company is named Indiana Bell, which does business as Ameritech Indiana.
2Rate of returnregulation limits pro…ts by setting prices to achieve a desired return on capital. Price capregulation
limits prices directly, without explicit reference to pro…ts or costs. See Averch and Johnson (1962) and Acton and
Vogelsang (1989) for characterizations of rate of return regulation and price caps, respectively.
3As long as the targeted rate is binding, that is.
4Although the comparison could go the other way, if a new product allows a …rm to increase its capital base under
rate of return regulation, which would increase its allowed pro…t. The literature does not contain a clear answer on
this point.
2as process innovation. Littlechild (1983) claimed that price caps increase the incentive to reduce
costs. Theoretical comparisons of rate of return and price cap regulation mainly con…rm Lit-
tlechild’s claims (e.g., Cabral and Riordan, 1989). Product innovation—bringing new goods to
market—may be put into the theoretical framework of process innovation: product innovation oc-
curs when a product’s cost is reduced from in…nity. However, the process innovation literature
typically focuses on small cost changes, and not all claims for process innovation necessarily apply
to product innovation.5 At least as important for product innovation as the distinction between
price caps and RoRR is the treatment of new services. Are new services immediately placed in
the rate base or the price cap basket, or is there a “grace period” to encourage innovation? Does
regulatory approval delay di¤er markedly between traditional and alternative regulation? While
thesecharacteristics could bebuilt into a theoretical model, ultimately whether pricecaps increase
innovation in any particular setting is an empirical issue. In the present study, most of the new
services were under market pricing rather than price caps. The comparison here, therefore, is not
a clear-cut comparison of pricecaps and RoRR but of RoRR and a mixture of incentiveregulation
and deregulation.
Opportunity Indiana e¤ectively increased the expected pro…t to the …rm of introducing a new
service for at least two reasons. First, as mentioned above most new services were allowed to be
freely priced. RoRR, on the other hand, places constraints on prices. Second, there are long tari¤
approval delays under RoRR. associated with plan approval—over four months on average, a long
time in the competitive and dynamic telecommunications industry. The delay reduces the present
value of a proposed new service and (more importantly) allows competitors to beat the regulated
…rm to market. By contrast, there are few approval delays under Opportunity Indiana.
The e¤ect of the alternative regulation on the number of services introduced can be formalized
with a simple argument. Let ¼ be the random variable representing the net present value of pro…t
5Bonanno and Haworth (1998) investigate the strategic di¤erences between product and process innovation (al-
though their concern is not with regulation).
3from a service, distributed with density F1 under RoRR and F2 during Opportunity Indiana. In
keeping with the discussion above assume that F2 stochastically dominates6 F1, implying that
expected pro…t is higher under Opportunity Indiana. Assuming the …rm introduces every service
inthepopulation ofpotential servicesthat haspositiveexpectedpro…t, then 1¡Fi(0) is thefraction
of the total population introduced under regime i. It follows directly from stochastic dominance
that ifthesizeofthepopulation ofpotential servicesis the sameunder both regimes, the…rm would
introduce more new services under alternative regulation. If the population of potential services
increases under lighter regulation, due to increased basic innovation by outside …rms because of
the more favorable prospects, then even more new services would be introduced under alternative
regulation.
The only empirical study ofwhich I am aware looking at product innovation and telecommuni-
cations regulation is Mueller (1993), who examines new service o¤erings by US West in Nebraska.
The (non-econometric) evidence suggests that deregulation was successful at speeding new service
introductionsin Nebraska, compared with other states.7 Therearea few studiesquantifying theim-
pact of incentive regulation on process innovation. Taylor, Zarkadas and Zona (1992), Greenstein,
McMaster and Spiller (1995), and Ai and Sappington (1998) all …nd that incentive regulation has-
tens the di¤usion of digital infrastructure compared with other regulatory methods. Unlike these
studies, which look at the means of providing a service, I look directly at the new services that
consumerspurchase. UnlikeHausman (1997), who estimates the impact ofregulatory delay on cel-
lular telephony and voice mail consumers, I am interested in the bigger picture of how regulation
a¤ects innovation in the entire class of telecommunications services and whether potential services
are introduced.
Therest ofthisintroduction previews the results. Ameritechgreatly increased itsrateofservice
introduction under Opportunity Indiana, responding to the new freedom to inaugurate and price
6I.e., F2(¼) · F1(¼) for all ¼ and the inequality is strict for some ¼.
7Mueller (1993) notes that US West may have merely shifted the order of introduction between states to provide
a “success story” for deregulation.
4services. The model estimates that moving away from RoRR increased the rate of service creation
to 2 to4.6 timestheold rate, depending onthetypeofservice. Overall, theestimated rateofservice
creation under Opportunity Indiana is3.0 times therateunderthe rate ofreturn regime. Expected
approval delay times were reduced to almost nothing (from 130 days before Opportunity Indiana
to three days during). During Opportunity Indiana, proposed services had a higher probability of
being approved as quickly as thelaw allowed, and thelaw allowed quickerintroductions. Using the
estimated model to project the innovation and introduction process under RoRR and Opportunity
Indiana, I …nd that Ameritech would have introduced twelve times as many services to consumers
during the study period if Opportunity Indiana had been in place the entire time.
Opportunity Indiana is described in the next section and the econometric model is introduced
in section 3. The data, estimations, and speci…cation tests are in section 4.1.1 for the innovation
submodel, and insection 4.2 fortheregulatory delay submodel. Thebene…t ofOpportunity Indiana
ismeasuredin section5. Section6 contains discussionofthevalidity ofthemodel forpolicy analysis
and concluding remarks.
2 Opportunity Indiana
In Indiana, Ameritech o¤ers basic local service, intrastate advanced services, and intrastate inter-
LATA access services, which are regulated by theIndiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC).
Mirroring regulation by the FCC, until the 1990s most state commissions placed the intrastate
activities of incumbent local exchange companies under RoRR. Thereafter several states, Indiana
included, began to experiment with alternative regulation.
This study examines new intrastate services introduced by Ameritech Indiana in its operating
territory. New services may allow higher transmission capability (e.g., ISDN8), capability to trans-
8Integrated Services Digital Networks (although suspicious regulators sometimes refer to ISDN as “Improvements
Subscribers Don’t Need”). ISDN is composed of digital lines capable of circuit and packet transmission for voice and
data communications at data rates up to 1.544 Mbps.
5mit new kinds of data (e.g., video), or central o¢ce features such as caller ID or restricted access
to 900 numbers. To o¤er these services, Ameritech typically makes use of technology developed
by upstream …rms and adapts it to work on their network and to o¤er the desired functional-
ity.9 For many of these services, Ameritech is the …rst to o¤er them (particularly to residential
subscribers). For other services, substitutes may be available from other …rms (particularly for
business customers).10
Until 1994, Ameritech Indiana operated under traditional RoRR. On June 30, 1994, the IURC
approved a stipulated agreement among various parties in response to an incentive regulation plan
proposed by Ameritech.11 The plan, known as Opportunity Indiana, gave Ameritech increased
‡exibility through 1997 to introduce and price services. Responding to Ameritech’s concern about
regulatory delay, the IURC streamlined the tari¤ approval process to allow quicker introduction
of new services. Before Opportunity Indiana, approval of a new service required docketing and
commission action. Under the new plan most services were approved automatically upon a day’s
notice. Also under the new plan, certain services related to basic local service were placed under
price caps. Other services deemed to be competitive were moved to a separate tari¤, the Service
Catalog; pricing of Catalog services is essentially unregulated, under the presumption that actual
orpotential competition limits thepricesAmeritech can charge. Opportunity Indiana also contains
provisions for local service rate reductions, infrastructure and education investments, and a free
subscription program in under-served areas(Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, 1997b). After
review ofthe…rst term, a modi…ed version of Opportunity Indiana wasapproved in December1997
for a second term.12
9There are elements of both innovation and di¤usion to the service introduction process. For simplicity, I will use
the term innovation.
10The wealth of technological options available in telecommunications means that there is usually something unique
about any …rm’s service, however.
11Order in Cause No. 39705 (Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, 1990).
12See Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (1998).
63 A Model for Service Innovation and Introduction
In the course of introducing regulated telecommunications services to subscribers, a …rm goes
through two steps. The …rm …rst creates a new end-user service, using technology that may be
developed by other …rms; I refer to this as innovation. After innovation, the services are not
introduced to subscribers until they are approved by the regulator. I model innovation as a count
process and the regulatory approval process as a duration process with selection. In the selection
model, theregulator…rst selectswhether a serviceisto be delayed, and ifso, thelength ofthedelay.
The conditional meansof the distributions aremodeled as functionsof economic, demographic, and
regulatory covariates. The model is formally equivalent to an in…nite-server queuing model.13 This
equivalence allows me to apply well-known queuing results, which will be useful for the projection
exercise carried out in Section 5.
To construct the likelihood of the data for the arrival and regulatory approval processes, the
marginal distributions and the nature of the correlation between the processes must be speci…ed.
Let the number of arrivals in period t be nt, a realization of a count (non-negative integer) valued
random variable, where t = 1; :: :;T. Denote the probability density function (pdf) of nt, con-
ditional on covariates wt, parameter vector ®, and a random e¤ect u1t, by f(ntjw0
t®;u1t). The

















Therandom e¤ect u1t isan unobserved heterogeneity term with variance ¿2
1; assumethat E(eu1t) =
1 so that E(nt) = exp (w0
t®) and that the intercept coe¢cient in ® is identi…ed. The inclusion of
u1t results in a generalized Poisson model that relaxes the equality of the mean and the variance
13See Prieger (1999) for details.
7implied by the simple Poisson model and allows overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).14
For the regulatory delay part of the model, a standard duration model is not appropriate, for
the following reasons. Both before and during Opportunity Indiana, there isa mandated minimum
regulatory delay, say s. One can break a complete duration into the deterministic part s and a
stochastic part t. In the data, s is 30 days under RoRR and one day under Opportunity Indiana.
Many observations are not delayed beyond the minimum (i.e., t = 0). Such events have zero
probability in any simple duration model. To accommodate these observations I adopt a selection
model, in which the regulator selects certain services to be delayed beyond the minimum and
then determines the length of the delay. Index the durations by i; each arrival has an associated
stochasticduration (possibly of length zero), so that i =1; :: :; N, where N ´
PT
t=1 nt. Split i into
index sets It so that fiji 2 Itg are the indices pertaining to period t. The econometric model I use
is the Type 2 Tobit bivariate selection model of Amemiya (1985), with an added random e¤ect u2t.
Let y1i be the log duration of the stochastic part ti of the ith regulatory delay, and let y2i be an
indicator for non-zero ti. Assume that fy1i;y2iji 2 Itg are de…ned by
y1i ´ log(ti) = x0
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where ("1i; "2i) are iid draws from a bivariate standard normal distribution, (x0
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i) are covariates,
¾ >0, ½2 2 [¡1;1], and (¯; °) are parameters to be estimated, and 1f¢g is the indicator function.
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5 and correlation ½2.15 Equations(4) and (5) composea probit
selection process. When y2i =1, the service is chosen to be delayed and delay ti is drawn from the
lognormal distribution given in (3). Themodel allows therandom variable in the selection equation
14In particular, if mt ´ exp(w
0
t®) and ± ´ exp(¿
2
1), then E(ntjwt) = mt and V ar(ntjwt) = mt[1 +mt(± ¡1)]
(Anscombe, 1950).
15The variance of the selection equation disturbance is normalized to unity for identi…cation of °.
8to be correlated with observed regulatory delays through ½2 and u2t. If the selection and duration
processes are correlated, then applying the baseline model to the observed nonzero delays would
lead to biasedinference. Correlation through½2 is spell-speci…c, and might havemany causesin the
regulatory context. For example, if the regulator mistakenly delays approval of a service it would
normally approve, then realizes its error and quickly approves the service after a short delay, then
the selection and delay variables will be negatively correlated.16 Conversely, if unobserved factors
make a speci…c service both more likely to be delayed and to have longer delays than observables
account for, then there will be positive correlation. In (3) and (4), u2t is a mixing term, common
across y1i and y¤
2i and across all i in period t. Correlation through u2t might represent unobserved
secular variables that in‡uences regulatory delay.
Taken together, (u1t ;u2t) represent unobserved period-speci…c heterogeneity. To complete the
model, assume that (u1t ;u2t) are de…ned by








where (´1t;´2t) are iid draws from a bivariate standard normal distribution, ¿1; ¿2 ¸ 0; and
















5, and correlation ½1. Thus ½1 is
the key parameter governing correlation between the count and regulatory delay processes. If ½1 is
positive, then departures from themeans in the count and regulatory delay processes are positively
correlated, as might happen if there is “regulatory congestion” due to the …nite resources of the
regulator. If½1 isnegative, then thecount and regulatory delay processes arenegatively correlated,
as might happen if the regulator feels pressure to expedite service approvals when there are many
new services created or if the …rm submits more new services to the regulator when approval times
are short. The de…nition of u1t ensures that E(eu1t) = 1, as required above. All parameters are
16I thank Michael Katz for this observation.
9identi…ed as long as nt ¸1 for at least one period.17
The joint pdf for the data in period t, fnt; y1i; y2iji 2 Itg, conditional on (u1t;u2t), is then





2ijy2i = 0;u2t)1(y2i=0) ¢ g(y1iju2t)1(y2i=1)
i
(6)
where the dependence on the parameters is suppressed in the notation. In the expression above,
the form of f(ntju1t), the Poisson pdf, is given by (2). The probability of observing a stochastic
duration of length zero, F(y¤
2ijy2i =0;u2t), is given by
F(y¤



























where Á is the pdf of a standard normal random variable, © is the cdf of the same, f(y1iju2t) is
the pdf of the durations conditional on observation and F(y¤
2ijy2i = 1;u2t) is the probability of
observing a non-zero duration (Amemiya, 1985). Since (u1t; u2t) are not observed, one …nds the
unconditional joint pdf by integrating out (u1t; u2t):





2ijy2i =0; u2t)1(y2i=0) ¢ g(y1iju2t)1(y2i=1)
i
(10)
where Eu1t;u2t denotes expectation taken over (u1t;u2t). The log likelihood for all time periods is
l(®;¯;°;½1;½2; ¾; ¿1; ¿2) =
T X
t=1
logf(nt;fy1i;y2iji 2 Itg) (11)
The expectation in (10) is a double integral that cannot be solved analytically, and numerical
methodsmust beused. IuseGaussianquadrature, with …fty evaluation pointsinboth dimensions.18
17If not, then the disturbance terms for y
¤




Strictly speaking, ¾ and ¿ 2 are identi…ed even in such a case through the cross equation restriction that ¿2 enters




2i, but without large sample sizes that restriction is likely to only weakly numerically
identify ¾ and ¿ 2.
18See Quandt (1983, section 8.2) for a brief introduction (and further references) to Gaussian quadrature.
10Estimation of this model therefore can be expensive when there are many covariates. Because of
this cost, in the application below, I experiment with small numbers of covariates at a time.
Although the general model (11) is rather complicated, it is about the simplest model that
allows correlation between the innovation and regulatory delay processes. The model contains
several familiar models as special cases. When ½1 =0, the count and Tobit models are independent
and may be estimated separately with full e¢ciency. When ¿1 = 0, the count model is the
standard Poisson model with no accounting for overdispersion. When ¿1 > 0 the count model is
the generalized Poisson model. When ½1 =0, thesecount modelsare independent oftheregulatory
approval process, and ® can be estimated consistently in either model by MLE based on (2) with
u1 identically equal to zero.19 Similarly, the Tobit model when ½2 >0 but ¿2 = 0 (selection but no
correlation with the arrival process) may be estimated by any ofthe usual methods for theTypeII
Tobit model (Amemiya, 1985). Estimating these restricted models is useful for hypothesis testing
and to provide starting values of (®; ¯;°;½2;¾; ¿1) for the full model maximum likelihood routine.
4 Data and Estimation of the Model
Since the innovation and regulatory delay models are independent if ¿1 = 0, I …rst discuss each
separately in sections 4.1.1 and 4.2. In section 4.3 I discuss the results from joint estimation of the
fully correlated model.
4.1 The Innovation Model
4.1.1 Data
I examine new intrastate non-access services introduced by Ameritech in its Indiana territory. In
1997, Ameritech provided information on all of its non-access tari¤ …lings since July 1991 (these
tari¤ …lings are part of the public record). The data compose a balanced study period of three
19Even when ¿ 1 > 0, MLE based on a simple Poisson model yields consistent estimates of ® as long as the
conditional mean is correctly speci…ed (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, sec. 3.2.3).
11RoRR Period OI Period
(7/91–6/94) (7/94–6/97)
Service Category Total Yearly Rate Total Yearly Rate Total
A: Local Access, Centrex, and 3 1.0 14 4.67 17
Central O¢ce Services
B: All Other Services 6 2.0 12 4.0 18
Total 9 3.0 26 8.67 35
Table notes: counts are new services in Ameritech Indiana’s Tari¤ numbers 7 and 8 before Opportunity Indiana,
and in their Service Catalog during Opportunity Indiana. RoRR is rate of return regulation; OI is Opportunity
Indiana.
Table 1: New Services Introduced Before and After Opportunity Indiana
years each before and after the start of Opportunity Indiana. Since no new service can be o¤ered
before being added to the tari¤, the …lings include all new services (see the Data Appendix for a
complete list).
Ameritech …led 185 tari¤ revisions, of which 51 are for new services. The …gure does not
include promotional o¤erings (temporary price decreases for existing services) or access services.
This …gure includes 15 …lings of new pricing options for existing services, which are …led as “new
services” under IURC rules.20 Because I want to count truly new services, and not new ways to
buy existing services, optional pricing plans areremoved from thedata set. After removing another
…ling that contained no new technology,21 35 new service …lings remain.
The new services are presented by category in Table 1. The services are grouped into two
categories. The …rst category, labeled A, comprises Local (exchange access), Centrex, and Central
O¢ceservicesandfeatures. Thesecondcategory, labeledB, comprisesOperator, PublicTelephone,
Wireless, Dedicated Communications, ISDN, Video, and Wide Area Telecommunications Services,
and other miscellaneous services. These categories are determined from the tari¤ section in which
the new service is included.
20This is not to say that new pricing options do not increase consumer welfare. If no existing pricing option is
replaced by a new option, the new option must (weakly) increase welfare.
21The ISDN Data Usage …ling (11/25/92) is merely a di¤erent price for a particular usage of technology already
covered in the ISDN Prime, Direct, and Centrex …lings from the same date.
124.1.2 Results
The dependent variable nt for (2) is the number of services in each month in each service category.
Separating the …lings between categories allows the arrival process to di¤er between categories
(i.e., allows category-speci…c …xed e¤ects). The random e¤ect u1t is common to both category
counts in month t.22 The two categories and 72 months in the observation period yield 144 count
observations.
The results of the estimation when the counts and durations are taken to be independent
(½1 = ¿2 = 0) are in Table 2. The …rst two columns are for the no covariates model with no
variables other than dummies for service category and Opportunity Indiana. The table includes
the estimates for the regulatory delay models as well, although I defer discussion of those results
until section 4.2. The category A coe¢cient (category B is the excluded dummy) is positive,
meaning that under the rate of return regimeAmeritech introduced services in the Local, Centrex,
and Central O¢cecategory at a slowerratethan Otherservices. The estimated coe¢cient of-0.693
for Local, Centrex, and Central O¢ce services implies that the creation rate ofsuch services is 50%
that of Other services (which exactly matches the data in Table 1).23 To interpret the coe¢cients
in the generalized Poisson estimations, recall that the log of the conditional mean of the count
process is linear in the covariates, so that positive coe¢cients imply greater counts.
Both of the Opportunity Indiana coe¢cients are positive(although only the …rst is statistically
signi…cant); there were more services in each category during the alternative regulatory regime.
The coe¢cients imply that the mean arrival rate of services in the Local, Centrex, and Central
22For clarity of presentation, the notation in section 3 does not refect the panel aspect of the count data. If the























23The percentage change in arrivals due to an indicator xj taking a value of 1 is %¢ = e
¯j ¡1.
13No Covariates Covariates
Variable coe¢cient s.e. coe¢cient s.e.
Innovation Count Model
intercept ¡1:801¤¤¤ 0:444 ¡2:607¤¤¤ 0:470
category A services ¡0:693 0:724 ¡0:691¤ 0:385
Opp. Indiana: category A services 1:563¤¤ 0:672 2:953¤¤¤ 0:643
Opp. Indiana: category B services 0:716 0:543 2:108¤¤¤ 0:663
population ¡0:758 4:208
…rm R&D (one year lag) 2:079¤¤¤ 0:706
Regulatory Delay Duration Model
intercept 4:255¤¤¤ 0:272 4:209¤¤¤ 0:286
Opportunity Indiana ¡3:690¤¤¤ 0:329 ¡3:647¤¤¤ 0:348
revenue (Opp. Indiana period only) ¡0:005 0:041
pages in tari¤ …ling 0:136 0:243
Regulatory Delay Selection Model
(Opp. Indiana period only)
intercept 0:487¤ 0:259 0:497 0:255
pages in tari¤ …ling 0:668 0:462
Incidental Parameters
½1 (innovation and delay corr.) 0 …xed 0 …xed
½2 (selection and duration corr.) 0:942¤¤¤ 0:067 0:973¤¤¤ 0:061
¾ (duration dispersion) 0:817¤¤¤ 0:126 0:822¤¤¤ 0:132
¿1 (innovation random e¤ect s.d.) 0:816¤¤¤ 0:267 0:559¤ 0:345
¿2 (delay random e¤ect s.d.) 0 …xed 0 …xed
log likelihood ¡125:08 ¡121:22
observations (counts) 144 144
observations (durations) 34 34
* = 10% level signi…cance; ** = 5% level signi…cance; *** = 1% level signi…cance.
Table notes: estimation is MLE based on (11) with ½1 and ¿2 …xed at zero, where the likelihood is evaluated via Gauss-
Hermite quadrature with 50 weighting points. Signi…cance levels are for one-tailed tests for ¿ and ¾ and two-tailed tests for
all other parameters. Dependent variable for the count model is monthly services within each category; dependent variable
for the duration model is log of the stochastic part of the regulatory delays (in days), as described in section 3; dependent
variable for the selection equation is 1 if delayed, 0 if not. The selection model is estimated for the Opportunity Indiana
(OI) period only; Pr(delay) before OI is taken to be 1. In each model, the conditional mean is linear in the covariates.
Continuous variables are in logs. Revenue is the yearly forecast at time of …ling, available only during OI.
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Generalized Poisson/Tobit II Model—Independent Version
14O¢ce category is 359% higher during Opportunity Indiana than before; that for Other services is
97% higher. Theformer is signi…cant at the 1% level; thelatteris not signi…cant (although the two
are jointly signi…cant).24 Thus Opportunity Indiana is correlated with a large increase in services
created, especially Local, Centrex, and Central O¢ce services.
Before putting weight on any interpretation of these results, it is necessary to test the no
covariates model’s assumptions. Consider …rst the possibility that themean is incorrectly speci…ed
through the omission of relevant variables. In empirical studies of telecommunications innovation,
economic and demographic variables often signi…cantly a¤ect innovation (e.g., Greenstein et al.,
1995). Ifvariablesthat in fact determinethemean areomitted, then all coe¢cient estimates will be
inconsistent. We want to be assured that innovation did not jump up during Opportunity Indiana
in response to changes in some causal variable other than the removal of the regulatory burden.
Accordingly, the second and third columns of Table 2 (labeled covariates) report an expanded
regression including other variables.25
In a short time series from a single state such as this one, most economic and demographic
variables arehighly correlated, so that multicollinearity precludes including all variablesofinterest.
For example, population, income, and number of access lines in the territory should a¤ect the
demand for new services. Including them all, however, yields nonsensically large coe¢cients and
huge standard errors. In the covariates regression reported in Table 2, I include log population
in Indiana. The coe¢cient is not signi…cant. The same result obtains if access lines or per-capita
incomeareincluded instead of population. In each casethesigni…canceof the Opportunity Indiana
variables is unchanged.
The next variable to check in the speci…cation is a control for changes in the size of the popula-
tion of potential new services. I add the log of real R&D spending by Ameritech, lagged one year.
The estimated coe¢cient is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.26 The coe¢cient
24A Wald test statistic for joint signi…cance is at the 0.96 quantile of a Â
2(2) distribution.
25In these estimations all new covariates are demeaned, so the intercepts are comparable across columns.
26Firm R&D …gures are the portion of R&D spending by Ameritech allocated to Indiana Bell (FCC Statistics of
15on R&D implies that every extra percent spent by the …rm on R&D resulted in 2.08 percent more
new services the following year, which works out to about $1.5M in R&D spending (above the
average) per extra new service (above the average). In exploratory work, neither industry R&D
nor U.S. patent counts from relevant technological areas were signi…cant.
Adding the extra variables in the covariates estimation does not steal the signi…cance from the
Opportunity Indiana indicators,27 and in fact greatly increase the estimated impact (1816% more
services in the category A and 723% more in category B).
A …nal area to explore is competition. To avoid the competition effect pitfall (Sappington and
Weisman, 1996), which ascribes bene…ts to lighter regulation when in fact they are caused by
increased competition, I control for the number of competitors in a separate estimation. What
was the competitive environment in Indiana during the study period? For the services under
consideration here, the closest form of competition would come from competing local exchange
companies and competitive access providers (CAPs). Local competition was still virtually non-
existent by theend of1997.28 CAPs were making more progress in Indiana, however. The variable
CAPs isthe log numberof …rmsproviding high-speed bypass access to businesses.29 The estimated
coe¢cient on CAPs whenit isadded to thecovariates regressionis -0.645 (1.03), insigni…cant. Most
importantly, theOpportunity Indiana coe¢cientsare still positiveand signi…cant at the 5% level;30
it does not appear that competition explains the increase in services.
It is never possible to test every potential covariate when considering omitted variables. How-
ever, to examine the e¤ects of shocks apart from the regulatory variables in a general way, I also
estimated the innovation model with the variables from the …rst column of 2 and a set of year
Communications Common Carriers ), adjusted by the GDP de‡ator.
27A Wald test statistic for the joint signi…cance of the Opportuntiy Indiana indicators has a p-value of 1.5E-4.
28Compared with the 2.4 million access lines owned by Ameritech Indiana, the company sold only 159 local service
lines for resale and …ve lines as unbundled network elements to other companies as of December 1997 (Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission, 1998).
29Data are from Harris (1997, exhibit 1), the FCC (Kraushaar, 1991–1997), and the IURC Annual Report 1996-
1997. The number of CAPs ranges from one in 1991 to 14 in 1997.
30The two Opportunity Indiana coe¢cients are 2.73
¤¤¤ (0.915) for category A and 1.89
¤¤ (0.82) for category B.
They are jointly signi…cant.
16dummies. These shocks might represent changes in the national or regional economy, competition,
or demand that a¤ect the …rm’s innovation. Even with the year dummies (none of which was
signi…cant),31 the Opportunity Indiana coe¢cients are still negative, with values falling between
the covariates and no covariates estimates in table 2. Both are signi…cant.32
Finally, considerthegeneralizedPoissonspeci…cationitself. Theestimated dispersion parameter
¿1 is 0.8 in the no covariates estimation, which implies that the average ratio of the conditional
variance to the conditional mean in the sample is 6.6 (this ratio would be unity in the simple
Poisson model).33 The estimated ¿1 drops to 0.56 in the covariates estimation, which implies that
the average predicted coe¢cient of variation in the sample is 3:1. Apparently the added covariates
account for some of the unexplained heterogeneity in the no covariates estimation. Both estimates
of ¿1 are signi…cant, although only marginally so in the covariates estimation. Since omitted
variables in the conditional mean function can induce overdispersion, the marginal signi…cance of
¿1 inthecovariates estimationgives someassurancethat otherimportant variablesarenot omitted.
Thepredicted mean servicesper year from thenocovariates and covariates models aregiven in
Table3 fortheperiodsbefore and during Opportunity Indiana. Thepredictionis T¡1 P
exp (w0
t^ ®),
the mean-in-sample of the predicted mean. The no covariates model estimates that under Oppor-
tunity Indiana the average number of new services increased by 5.8 per year compared with the
RoRR period (a 196%increase), which iscloseto theactual observed increaseof…veand two-thirds
per year.34 The covariates model predictions are similar: the estimated mean yearly services from
the covariates estimation is 3.00 for the rate of return era and 8.69 for the Opportunity Indiana
era.
31An LR test of the model with year …xed e¤ects vs. the model without fails to reject the simpler model (statistic
is at the 0.818 quantile of a Â
2(6) random variable).
32The two Opportunity Indiana coe¢cients are 2.78
¤¤¤ (1.05) for category A and 1.96
¤ (1.00) for category B. They
are jointly signi…cant.
33The conditional variance of the generalized Poisson nt is ¹t(1 +¹t[exp(¿
2




34Unlike the standard Poisson model, when there are random e¤ects (¿1 > 0) the mean-in-sample of the predicted
mean calculated from the ML estimates is not identically equal to the sample average of the counts.
17Predicted Mean Yearly Services Actual Mean
Period No Covariates Covariates Yearly Services
Rate of Return Regulation 2.97 3.00 3.00
Opportunity Indiana 8.78 8.69 8.67
Table 3: Predicted vs. Actual New Services
4.2 The Regulatory Delay Model
4.2.1 Data
Turn now to the regulatory delay submodel. The tari¤ data also contain the e¤ective date of the
…ling, so that the approval delay can be calculated. Before Opportunity Indiana, a new service
could not be introduced until its tari¤ …ling had been actively approved by the IURC, and the
commission required the …ling to be docketed for at least 30 days before decision. Delay in excess
of the 30 day minimum was caused by sta¤ investigation of the tari¤ and the wait until the next
commission meeting. After July 1994 under Opportunity Indiana, new services were generally
presumed lawful (requiring no action by the IURC) and were introduced with one day of notice.
The average delay for all services over the entire observation period was 39 days, the median was
four days, and the maximum was 217 days.
The minimum mandated regulatory delays (30 days before Opportunity Indiana and one day
during Opportunity Indiana) are treated as deterministic in the analysis (refer to discussion in
section 3). Summary statistics on the remaining, stochastic part of the delay times are in Table 4.
I refer to the total delay less the deterministic part as the adjusted delay time.
The delays during Opportunity Indiana were very short, averaging about a week.35 In fact, if
the largest adjusted delay time of 93 days is dropped, the next highest is a mere nine days and
the average falls to three days. This outlier was not included in the estimations to avoid undue
35According to Ameritech, there were no approval delays at all during Opportunity Indiana, except when the
company chose a later e¤ective date for a …ling than the minimum allowed (personal communication with Bruce
Hazelett, Director of Regulatory A¤airs, Ameritech Indiana). I remain agnostic about the cause of the apparent
delays. Given that the “delays” (real or self-imposed)are so short, they do not a¤ect the cost of regulation calculation
much in section 5.
18For Non-Zero Observations
Observations Zeroes Min. Median Mean Max.
RoRR 9 0 13 96 102.6 187
Opportunity Indiana 26 7 1 2 7.6 93
Entire Period 35 7 1 3 38.1 187
Table notes: all units are days. RoRR is Rate of Return Regulation. The adjusted delay times are the total
delay times less the minimum mandated approval periods (30 days for the RoRR regime, one day for Opportunity
Indiana).
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Adjusted Approval Delay Durations
in‡uence on the results.
Limited characteristics of each …ling are also available. The number of pages composing the
…ling can proxy the unobserved complexity of the …ling. During Opportunity Indiana we also have
the projected revenue from the service, which is submitted to the IURC with the …ling.
4.2.2 Results
Section3 introducesa bivariateselectionmodel to handlethelargenumberofzeroesin the adjusted
delay times. Recall that correlation between the decisions is captured by the parameter ½2, which
is zero if the decisions are uncorrelated. There are no zeroes in the data before Opportunity
Indiana (i.e., the services are always delayed), so the selection equation is estimated only for the
Opportunity Indiana period (i.e., before Opportunity Indiana the selection equation puts weight 1
on y2 = 1).
The bottom part of Table 2 contains the estimated model for the case in which the duration
and selection models are independent of the count model (¿1 = 0). The …rst two columns include
no covariates, other than an indicator for Opportunity Indiana. The …nal two columns include
the pages and revenue covariates. In both estimations, the indicator for Opportunity Indiana in
the duration model is strongly signi…cant. In fact, the indicator alone is responsible for reducing
the delays nearly to zero: the percentage change due to the indicator is about ¡97:5% in each
19No Covariates Covariates
RoRR OI RoRR OI
Mandated Minimum Delay 30 1 30 1
Predicted Probability of Delay 1.0 (…xed) 0.69 1.0 (…xed) 0.67
Predicted Total Delay
observed (conditional on y2 = 1) 128.4 4.09 129.4 4.13
latent 128.4 3.45 129.4 3.44
Table notes: units are days. Last two rows are the sum of the mandated minimum delay and the predicted
stochastic delay. RoRR is the rate of return regulation period; OI is the Opportunity Indiana period. Figures
calculated as mean-in-sample using estimated coe¢cients from Table 2; see footnote 37 for details.
Table 5: Predicted Regulatory Approval Delays
estimation.36 Before Opportunity Indiana all approvals were delayed; during Opportunity Indiana
the chance of delay drops to 0.69 in the …rst estimation and 0.67 in the second (see Table 5).
Neither tari¤ …ling pages nor service revenues are signi…cant in either theselection or the duration
models. Pages has the expected sign: more pages (i.e., more complex …lings) means that the
probability of delay is higher and that delays are longer. Services with higher expected revenues
create longer delays when delayed. In both estimations the selection and delay disturbances are
highly correlated; ½ di¤ers signi…cantly from zero. This positive correlation might be caused by
unobserved factors that lead the regulator both to delay approval with higher probability and to
make the delay longer than average.
The estimated total delay, including the minimum approval period, is much shorter under
Opportunity Indiana. Combining theselection and thedelay results, expected total observed delay
time fell from about 129 days under RoRR to about 4 days during Opportunity Indiana.37 Table
5 lists the predicted delays from the two estimations.
36The formula in footnote 23 applies to this model as well.
37Predicted total observed delay before Opportunity Indiana is calculated as the mean-in-sample of the minimum
delay plus E(e
y1jxi): i.e., the average of 30 + exp(x
0
i^ ¯ + ¾
2=2) (e
y1 is lognormal) in the pre-OI sample. During
Opportunity Indiana, the formula is the average of Pr(y2 = 0jzi) ¢ 1 + Pr(y2 = 1jzi) ¢ E(e
y1jy2 = 1; xi; zi) in the
OI sample, where E(e
y1jy2 = 1; xi; zi) is approximated by expfE(y1jy2 = 1; xi;zi)g ¢ [1 +V (y1jy2 = 1;xi;zi)=2], a
second order approximation. The expressions for E(y1jy2 = 1; x; z) and V (y1jy2 = 1;x;z) are given in Greene (1993,
p.707). Predicted total latent delay is the average of exp(x
0
i^ ¯ +¾
2=2)in the pre- or post-OI sample, as indicated.
204.3 The Jointly Correlated Model
Turn now to the full model with unrestricted correlation allowed between the count and duration
models. The results from the unrestricted no covariates and covariates estimations are in Table
6. In these estimations, unlike those reported in Table 2, ½1 and ¿2 are allow to vary. In general,
the coe¢cients of interest are close to those in Table 2. In particular, the Opportunity Indiana
indicators are still signi…cant.
Anexamination oftheincidental parametersgivesinsight into thecorrelationamong themodels.
The correlation between the count and duration models is negative, as measured by ½1 in the no
covariates estimation. Such negative correlation means that a shock leading to more innovation,
and therefore more tari¤s submitted to the regulator, has the e¤ect of reducing regulatory delay
time. An interpretation may be that the IURC relaxes its scrutiny of tari¤s as they stacked up
in the regulatory inbox. The estimate of ½1 is not signi…cant, however. Turning to the covariates
estimation, ^ ½1 is again negative but no assessment of its signi…cance can be made because the
likelihood is maximized at the boundary ½1 = ¡1. This is likely due to the modest sample size
and the numerical complexity of the estimation. LR tests of each unrestricted estimation against
its restricted counterpart fail to reject the restricted model. Given this, it appears best to rely on
the estimations in Table 2 for the prediction exercise in the next section.
One change between the restricted and unrestricted models is that ¾, the duration dispersion
parameter, dropsfromabout 0.8 intherestrictedmodel toabout 0.6in theunrestricted model. This
is partly due to the extra heterogeneity entering the duration equation through ¿2; heterogeneity
from ¾ is being partly replaced by heterogeneity from the monthly random e¤ect, the strength of
which is measured by ¿2.
21No Covariates Covariates
Variable coe¢cient s.e. coe¢cient s.e.
Innovation Count Model
intercept ¡1:781¤¤¤ 0:452 ¡2:605¤¤¤ 0:498
category A services ¡0:693 0:761 ¡0:693 0:758
Opp. Indiana: category A services 1:523¤¤ 0:707 2:936¤¤¤ 0:800
Opp. Indiana: category B services 0:676 0:561 2:089¤¤¤ 0:674
population ¡0:155 1:406
…rm R&D (one year lag) 2:198¤¤¤ 2:198
Regulatory Delay Duration Model
intercept 4:294¤¤¤ 0:396 4:339¤¤¤ 0:330
Opportunity Indiana ¡3:585¤¤¤ 0:364 ¡3:505¤¤¤ 0:366
revenue (Opp. Indiana period only) 0:011 0:032
pages in tari¤ …ling 0:200 0:244
Regulatory Delay Selection Model
(Opp. Indiana period only)
intercept 0:709¤¤ 0:361 0:846¤¤¤ 0:299
pages in tari¤ …ling 0:791 0:533
Incidental Parameters
½1 (innovation and delay corr.) ¡0:279 0:661 ¡1:000 …xedy
½2 (selection and duration corr.) 0:941¤¤¤ 0:092 0:966¤¤¤ 0:075
¾ (duration dispersion) 0:666¤¤¤ 0:131 0:640¤¤¤ 0:140
¿1 (innovation random e¤ect s.d.) 0:794¤¤¤ 0:298 0:420¤¤ 0:250
¿2 (delay random e¤ect s.d.) 0:472¤¤¤ 0:203 0:541¤¤¤ 0:199
log likelihood ¡124:15 ¡119:50
observations (counts) 144 144
observations (durations) 34 34
* = 10% level signi…cance; ** = 5% level signi…cance; *** = 1% level signi…cance.
yThe estimated likelihood is maximized when ½1 = ¡1; see text.
Table notes: see notes to table 2.
Table 6: Estimation Results for the Generalized Poisson/Tobit II Model—Joint Version
225 The Bene…ts of Opportunity Indiana
Now that we have estimated the parameters for the entire model, we can compare the overall
e¤ect of the regulatory change on service introductions in the two periods. This section uses the
parameters estimated in the restricted, independent covariates model (columns three and four of
Table 2). We can compare two counterfactual scenarios. In scenario 1, Ameritech remains under
RoRR forthe entireobservation period (July 1991 to June1997). In scenario 2, Ameritech is under
Opportunity Indiana for the entire observation period. For each scenario, the covariates for the
innovation model are set to their appropriate yearly values and the covariates for the regulatory
delay models are set to sample averages. How many new services would we expect to have been
introduced in each scenario? Comparing the two answers will measure the total e¤ect that the
regulatory regime had on innovation. These answers di¤er from a simple extrapolation of the
predicted means in Table3 because of the counterfactual valueofthe Opportunity Indiana dummy
variable here and because here I am interested in services that are both created and approved, not
just innovation (although the latter ends up making little di¤erence).
Table7 showsthat in Scenario 1, the model predictsAmeritech createsand introduces about 11
new services. UnderOpportunity Indiana, thecompany createsandintroducesabout 133 services—
12 times as many as in scenario 1. In each scenario more services are created in the …rst part of
the observation period because the coe¢cient on R&D is positive and observed R&D expenditure
exhibits a downward trend. Approval delays have little e¤ect in these calculations, because the
delays in each scenario are relatively short compared to the observation period and because most
services are created near the beginning of the observation period.38 The average is 121.82 more
services approved under Opportunity Indiana than under rate of return regulation; the standard
38Less that 0.1 service on average is still delayed at the end of the observation period in each scenario. Finding
the services introduced net of those still pending approval at the end of the observation period requires a result from
queuing theory. If arrivals are Poisson with mean ¸ and the CDF of the delays is G, then the services introduced
(the output of the queuing system) at time t is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with mean ¤(t) = ¸
R t
0 G(s)ds
(Ross, 1983, p.39). The actual formula used is a modi…cation of this result re‡ecting two extensions: the arrival
process is generalized Poisson, and the arrival rate varies each year. Details of the calculation are available upon
request.
23Scenario 1: Scenario 2:
Rate of Return Opportunity Indiana Di¤erence
Year 1 3.56 42.25
Year 2 3.06 36.39
Year 3 2.38 28.30
Year 4 1.17 13.89
Year 5 0.63 7.55
Year 6 0.30 4.60
Entire Period (sum) 11.10 132.98 121.88
standard deviation 3.47 16.30 16.67
Table notes: cell entries are the average number of services created in the given year that are introduced to
subscribers (i.e., were approved by the regulator) by the end of the observation period. Prediction is based on
the estimated covariates model from Table 2. See text and footnote 39 for details.
Table 7: Comparison of Predicted Services Introduced to Subscribers
deviation of 16.7 indicates that the di¤erence is bounded well away from zero in probability.39
Exercises comparing counterfactual scenarios are only as good as the assumptions they rest
upon. Given the di¢culties inherent in out-of-sample prediction, it is perhaps best to view this ex-
erciseasillustrativerather thanto placestresson thenumerical resultsper se. The results from the
exercise illustrate the two ways that incentive regulation bene…ts consumers oftelecommunications
services. First, many more new telecommunications services werecreated under the price caps and
market pricing. It seems that the incentive to introduce new services increased substantially when
the IURC replaced RoRR with Opportunity Indiana. Second, the reduced mandatory approval
time and thelower probability of a service being delayed beyond the minimum means that services
were available to customers sooner under price caps.
Even if Ameritech would have introduced twelve times as many services under Opportunity
Indiana, welfare probably would not have risen proportionally. The services introduced during
Opportunity Indiana were probably not of importancecomparable to the services introduced under
39The standard deviation accounts for intrinsic variation only, not estimation error.
24the rateofreturn regime. The incremental services introduced during Opportunity Indiana—those
that would not have been introduced under the previous regime—most likely created less revenue
for the BOCs since they were formerly deemed unpro…table to introduce. Accordingly, they were
probably worth less to consumers as well. There is no way to estimate this di¤erence in worth (to
the company or the consumer) with the present data.40
6 The Validity of the Model for Policy Analysis
It appears that the price cap/deregulatory regime had a large impact on the number and timing of
service introductions and therefore on consumer welfare. There are potential problems to consider
whenmoving from correlationtocausality, however. In addition to thecompetition e¤ect pitfall dis-
cussed above, two otherpitfalls may apply. Thedemonstration e¤ects pitfall (Sappington and Weis-
man, 1996) is created when regulated carriersperform actions regulators desire, such as introducing
new services, to “demonstrate” the success of a favorable regulatory regime. Unfortunately—from
the standpoint of looking for a “natural experiment”—it is quite likely that the demonstration
e¤ect in‡uenced Ameritech’s actions. There was much discussion in the regulatory hearings about
the potential for lighter regulation to spur innovation, both in 1994 before Opportunity Indiana
and in 1997 when it was under review. Innovation was clearly one dimension of performance on
which Ameritech was to be judged.
Thesequencing pitfall applies if…rms’ actions arespurred by anticipated changes in the regula-
tory regime. This pitfall might apply to these data if, right before the switch to Opportunity
Indiana, Ameritech held o¤ on introducing new services in anticipation of the more favorable
environment shortly coming. This pitfall is related to the demonstration e¤ect; shifting a service
introduction into Opportunity Indiana also has the advantage of making the relaxed regulation
look more conducive to innovation. The evidence is inconclusive on whether sequencing e¤ects are
40Service revenue data are available only for the Opportunity Indiana …lings.
25present or not. Ameritech submitted a spate of tari¤s shortly after Opportunity Indiana began.
When indicators for the six months right before the regime change and right after are included in
the no covariates estimation, they have the signs that the sequencing pitfall predicts. However,
when othercovariates (population and R&D) are controlled for, neither sequencing e¤ect indicator
issign…cant. Inbothestimationsthepositivesignsremain on theOpportunity Indiana indicators.41
A simple test to see if the demonstration and sequencing e¤ects unduly in‡uence the data is
to compare a prediction from the estimated model with some out-of-sample data. In particular,
if the demonstration and sequencing e¤ects caused Ameritech to introduce more services than
Opportunity Indiana would have spurred apart from these incentives, then the rate of service
introduction should drop o¤ over time. The model predicts Ameritech would produce about 6.5
services on average in a nine month period under the lighter regulation (from Table 3). During the
…rst nine months of 1999, the company introduced eight new services—exceeding the prediction,
and well within the normal variation of a Poisson process.42 So although the caution remains, the
demonstration and sequencing e¤ects do not appear to unduly bias the estimation.
No regulatory reform should be judged along a single dimension. Opportunity Indiana was a
success at getting more services into the hands of consumers, but may not have performed as well
by other criteria.43 It would also be informative to measure the impact of the new services on
consumer welfare—a task that awaits better data. Regardless, the evidence indicates that moving
away from rate of return regulation spurs product innovation. This study is an initial step towards
…lling the lacuna in the literature concerning alternative regulation and product innovation.
41When added to the no covariates estimation with ½1 = 0, the indicator for the six months just before the regime
change has coe¢cient ¡0:458 (0.973); the indicator for the six months just after the regime change has coe¢cient
1:150 (0.500). Adding these indicators also steals some signi…cance from the Opportunity Indiana indicator for local,
Centrex, and CO services: the p-value rises to 0.089. When added to the covariates estimation with ½1 = 0, the
indicator for the six months before the change has coe¢cient ¡0:111 (0.972); the indicator for the six months after the
change has coe¢cient ¡1:12 (0.708). Again, adding these indicators steals some signi…cance from the Opportunity
Indiana indicator for local, Centrex, and CO services: the p-value rises to 0.062.
42Eight is the 0.79-quantile of a Poisson random variable with mean 6.5.
43In particular, questions were raised about apparently declining service quality (Sword, 1999).
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Data Appendix
This appendix contains all the new services Ameritech introduced in Indiana during the period
three years before and after the onset of Opportunity Indiana.
Date of Date Approval
Service Filing E¤ective Delay
Before Opportunity Indiana
OPTINET 64 Kbps 11/14/91 02/05/92 83
Centrex Custom Calling Features 09/30/92 02/03/93 126
OPTINET DS1 384 Kbps 10/15/92 01/06/93 83
ISDN Prime 11/25/92 06/30/93 217
ISDN Direct 11/25/92 06/30/93 217
ISDN Centrex 11/25/92 06/30/93 217
Residence Custom Calling Type 2 03/29/93 09/08/93 163
Caller ID with Name 11/19/93 01/02/94 44
800 Directory Assistance 05/11/94 06/23/94 43
During Opportunity Indiana
Billing Reports 07/27/94 07/28/94 1
Toll Restriction—Residential 09/08/94 09/13/94 5
Ameritech Area Wide Networking 09/15/94 09/19/94 4
Scan Alert 10/13/94 10/15/94 2
High Voltage Protection Service 10/28/94 10/30/94 2
128 & 256 Kbps (Fractional DS1) 10/28/94 10/31/94 3
ISDN Direct New Features 10/28/94 11/07/94 10
Ameritech ISDN Prime New Features 11/03/94 11/07/94 4
2-Way DID with Call Transfer 11/09/94 11/15/94 6
29Date of Date Approval
Service Filing E¤ective Delay
Answer Supervision with Line Side In-
terface
11/14/94 11/15/94 1
Ameritech Digital Transport Service 01/17/95 01/18/95 1
Ameritech Advanced Video Service 02/03/95 02/06/95 3
Packet Switched Network Services 02/24/95 02/27/95 3
Business Call Forwarding—Temporary 03/03/95 03/06/95 3
Ameritech Intercept Referral Extension 03/16/95 03/20/95 4
Advanced Custom Calling Features—
Pay Per Use
05/31/95 06/01/95 1
Ameritech Call Control 07/07/95 07/10/95 3
FlexLine 09/15/95 09/18/95 3
Prepaid Card 12/11/95 12/15/95 4
Information Call Completion 02/29/96 03/01/96 1
Calling Party Pays—Paging 04/09/96 04/10/96 1
Movers Call Forwarding 05/24/96 08/26/96 94
Ameritech Prime Number 06/04/96 06/06/96 2
Call Detail 06/18/96 06/19/96 1
Inmate Collect 06/28/96 07/01/96 3
3-Way Calling Pay Per Use 03/20/97 03/24/97 4
30